Macroeconomic models with microeconomic foundations should be consistent with macroeconomic and microeconomic facts. This paper proposes a model that combines two strands of the literature on stickiness in order to match both sets of facts. (1) Firms acquire information infrequently, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) , resulting in sticky information. (2) Firms face menu costs which they must pay to change prices, leading to state-dependent sticky prices at the micro level. I estimate key structural parameters and show that a model of sticky prices in a sticky-information environment is consistent with micro and macro evidence.
I Introduction
Macroeconomic models with microeconomic foundations should be consistent with both macroeconomic and microeconomic facts. In a series of recent papers, Mankiw and Reis (2002 , 2006 and Reis (2006b) suggest that a model with informational frictions among price setters can fit a number of basic macroeconomic facts. The drawback to this model, however, is that it is not consistent with empirical evidence on pricing using micro level data.
This paper proposes a model that combines two strands of the literature on stickiness in order to match both sets of facts. First, because it is costly to acquire, absorb, and process information, firms infrequently update their information on aggregate conditions. Thus, at a given moment in time firms hold a variety of beliefs about the state of the economy.
Second, firms face explicit "menu" costs which they must pay to change their prices.
These costs lead to state-dependent pricing decisions and price rigidity at the firm level. This is true even though the model includes positive trend inflation.
Putting sticky prices into a sticky-information environment takes a step toward Carroll's (2003, p. 295) suggestion that the "real world presumably combines some degree of price stickiness and a degree of expectational stickiness." This paper lends support to such a conjecture. I estimate an important role for both sticky prices and sticky information using indirect inference, based on the model's ability to match empirical evidence on macroeconomic fluctuations as embodied in an empirical Phillips curve and on microeconomic evidence on the mean size of and duration between price changes. I estimate that 31% of firms update their information in an average quarter, and the average duration between updates is 3.2 quarters. The data also require strong real rigidities, with a reduced-form parameter estimate of 0.06. Finally, the representative firm faces menu costs equal to 1.45% of steady state revenues and large idiosyncratic shocks, with a standard deviation of 7%. Sticky prices in a sticky-information environment also produce inertial, hump-shaped responses of the output gap and inflation to a nominal shock.
Omitting price rigidity from the model is not innocuous. Without price stickiness, I show that the model fails to match empirical evidence on price adjustment at the micro level. In addition, omitting price rigidity changes the parameter estimates, with the estimated fraction of firms updating their information in an average quarter falling to 18%. But most importantly, the model with sticky prices and sticky information provides a closer fit to the macro data than a model with only sticky information. Such a finding suggests that macroeconomic models with the "right" microeconomic foundations may also provide a better fit to macroeconomic data.
Both assumptions underlying the model-that information acquisition and price adjustment are costly activities-are supported by empirical evidence. For instance, in a case study of an industrial firm Zbaracki et al. (2004) document and quantify these and other costs associated with changing prices and find that they sum to more than 1% of revenues. A variety of other studies have inferred the existence of information and price-adjustment costs through case studies, observation of prices or expectations, or estimation of reduced-form models.
The fact that firms use state-dependent pricing is significant. State-dependent pricing invokes what is known as the "selection effect": firms whose prices are farthest from their targets are the ones most likely to adjust.
1 As Caplin and Spulber (1987) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) show, this selection effect can eliminate or diminish monetary non-neutrality. Infrequent information updating in a state-dependent pricing model mitigates this selection effect, since firms do not always know exactly how their actual price compares with their optimal price. This helps to generate non-neutrality in the model.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III shows how the baseline model compares with special cases in which firms face only sticky prices or only sticky information. Section IV estimates the model and discusses the results. Section V concludes.
II A Model of Sticky Prices in a Sticky-Information Environment
This paper constructs a model in which firms face costs to acquiring new information and pay explicit menu costs to change prices. This approach combines two strands of the literature on stickiness. Recent work on sticky information has focused attention on the fact that not all agents in an economy have the most up-to-date information, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) , since information acquisition and processing are costly. At the same time, there is a vast literature exploring the causes and consequences of sticky prices; Taylor (1999) provides a brief summary.
In this section, I combine Mankiw-Reis information updating with state-dependent pricing to produce a model of sticky prices in a sticky-information environment.
2 2 This distinguishes the present paper from others that blend elements of sticky prices and incomplete information. Kiley (2000) allows firms to choose their Calvo probability of adjusting their price and whether to pay a cost to acquire the current period's information or use the previous period's information for free. The empirical results do not focus on the imperfect-information channel. Bonomo and Garcia (2001) model an economy in which firms face menu costs to change prices, and information is distributed to all firms simultaneously and at discrete intervals. Combined with the assumption that each firm's frictionless optimal price follows an exogenous, driftless Brownian motion, this implies that no firm will change its price between information updates. Bonomo and Carvalho (2004) justify fixed-price time-dependent rules in a model where firms pay a single cost to update their information and change their prices simultaneously. Such rules are analyzed in the context of a singular disinflation. Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga (2006) 
Real marginal costs for firm i depend on two components: an idiosyncratic term χ it (e.g., a productivity shock) and the economy-wide gross output gap.
( )
The idiosyncratic component of marginal cost follows
The symmetric, flexible-price/full-information natural rate of output, Y t N , is normalized to one for all t and the parameter δ ensures that output converges to it in the steady state. The parameter γ is a measure of real rigidity, in the spirit of Ball and Romer (1990) This paper combines infrequent information updating with state-dependent pricing. Each period, a firm updates its information about the state of the aggregate world with probability λ, as suggested by Reis (2002, 2003) . This probability is independent of the firm's information-updating history. Implicitly, this process is a reduced form that captures the costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing information; Reis (2006b) provides a theoretical justification for how such a framework can arise if producers face an explicit information cost.
With probability 1−λ, the firm does not acquire new information on aggregate conditions. expectations formed on the basis of aggregate information from time t−j and idiosyncratic information from time t. In the next period, with probability λ the firm will acquire M t+1 , P t+1 , etc.; with probability 1−λ, the firm will not update its aggregate information, and it will have gone j+1 periods without an information update. In either case, the firm discounts the future at constant rate β, goes into the next period with nominal price P it−1 , and will face χ it+1 . Thus the value to the firm of keeping its old price, given it observed P t−j , M t−j , and Δm t−j when it last updated its aggregate information j periods ago, is 1 1 , 
Alternatively, firm i can pay the menu cost Φ and change its nominal price to P it . It takes into account the expected profits from this change in the current period and the value of going into the following period with this new price (and the probabilities that the firm will or will not update its information). Thus the value to the firm of changing its price in period t, given it observed P t−j , M t−j , and Δm t−j when it last updated its information j periods ago, is 1 ,
The firm optimizes over these choices, such that the expected value to the firm of entering period t with price P it−1 , idiosyncratic marginal cost component χ it , and last having updated its aggregate information j periods ago is
Second, consider the case in which the firm acquires new aggregate information in period t. The firm's problem then becomes a special case of the above with j=0. In that case, the firm would make its decision regarding whether to keep its price or change it using χ it , P t , M t , Δm t , etc. Since the firm sees current period values, there is no uncertainty over the profits the firm will earn in period t. All uncertainty regards the future facing the firm.
Note that in the case of Φ=0, price changes are costless. Because firms change prices at will, they only seek to maximize contemporaneous profits-or their expected level, when based upon old information.
Computational Issues and Expectations
When information updating occurs with constant probability λ, it is possible for a firm to go an extraordinarily long time between information updates. To avoid this, I assume there is a j max beyond which a firm updates with certainty. That is, if a firm enters period t last having updated its aggregate information j max periods ago and does not acquire new information today, it knows with certainty that it will update its information in the following period. This assumption is plausible for real-world firms, who would not wish to be too ill-informed. A number of papers using state-dependent pricing-e.g., Ball and Mankiw (1994) , Ireland (1997) -use a similar mechanism to maintain tractability. Given this assumption, the model nests the possibility (if λ=0) that information updating is perfectly staggered across firms, as in a Taylor-type model.
As a second point, note that one could rewrite the firm's profit function (2.3) as , , , ,
A firm with aggregate information j periods old knows its nominal price relative to P t−j , and it also knows M t−j /P t−j . Since money growth follows (2.4), Δm t−j can be used to form expectations over all possible realizations of cumulative money growth since the last information update,
. To form expectations over aggregate variables, I assume that firms use a forecasting rule in the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998) as applied by Willis (2002) . Such a rule is consistent with the idea that information acquisition, absorption, and processing are costly activities and surveying a continuum of other firms would be prohibitively expensive, since the rationalexpectations solution to the model would require that firms know all the state variablesincluding the relative prices and the complete information sets-of an arbitrarily large number of other firms. Firms make linear j-period-ahead forecasts of real money balances via ( ) Krusell and Smith (1998, p. 875) , such a procedure leads to a "computed, approximate equilibrium."
III Comparing Impulse Responses
To illustrate the dynamics that arise from the model, this section compares impulse responses generated from the baseline model with sticky prices and sticky information with the (nested) special cases in which firms face only sticky prices or only sticky information.
Model Calibration Table 1 The constant desired markup is θ/(θ−1)=1.2, consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) . The persistence of the idiosyncratic marginal cost shocks, ρ χ , is set to 0.7, as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a, 2007b) . The maximum number of quarters that a firm would go without updating its information, j max , is set to eight. Thus a firm that has not acquired information in the last eight quarters does so with certainty in the next quarter (i.e., the ninth quarter after the last update). As an upper bound, this is above most estimates of the average duration between aggregate information updates from empirical studies that omit price stickiness. 
Comparison with the Mankiw-Reis Model
The model set out in Section II nests several special cases. When Φ=0, firms costlessly change prices and set the price that they expect to be optimal-based upon information acquired as of their last information update j periods ago-at time t, and firms acquire new aggregate information with probability λ in a given period. This is a sticky-information model ("SI"), similar to the model originally proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
Comparison among Forms of Stickiness
Aside from the sticky-information-only case above, the baseline model from Section II also nests the sticky-price-only case ("SP"), in which λ=1 and all firms have complete knowledge over all aggregate and idiosyncratic variables in all periods. Figure 2 presents generalized impulse responses for the sticky-information and sticky-price cases and compares them with the baseline sticky-price/sticky-information model ("SP/SI").
In the sticky-price model, all firms immediately see the change in nominal demand growth. Furthermore, given the AR process for money growth, they know the effects of the shock will persist for several quarters. In conjunction with their idiosyncratic shocks, firms have an incentive to respond almost immediately to the shock-thus the inflation rate quickly increases, peaking in the quarter of the shock. Nevertheless, the shock does yield real effects, owing to the real rigidity parameter γ. Less real rigidity (i.e., a larger value of γ) would produce a larger inflation response and a smaller output response, pushing the results toward those of Golosov and Lucas (2007) .
With only sticky information, prices are flexible but only a fraction of price setters see the shock when it occurs (and therefore know to respond). Real rigidity in the model further constrains action on the part of the informed firms, as they do not wish to have their prices too far from their competitors'. This results in a delayed inflation response and stronger real effects than in the sticky-price case.
The model with sticky prices and sticky information combines these mechanisms. Sticky information prevents some firms from seeing the aggregate shock immediately; sticky prices prevent some firms from reacting to the aggregate shock immediately; and real rigidity constrains firms from setting prices too different from their competitors', ceteris paribus. The ultimate result is considerable monetary non-neutrality in the model.
IV Estimation and Discussion
While a number of studies have estimated the frequency with which firms update information, these studies employ reduced-form equations based on the implicit assumption that prices are fully flexible. Empirical evidence on pricing at the micro level contradicts such an assumption.
In this section, I use simulation techniques to estimate four structural model parameters via indirect inference: (1) the probability that a given firm will acquire new aggregate information in a given period, λ; (2) the amount of real rigidity in the model, γ; (3) the size of the firms' menu costs, Φ; and (4) the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks to marginal cost, σ χ . I assess the model's ability to match post-1983 U.S. data because it affords relative stability and because recent empirical studies on price adjustment at the micro level use data from this period. where y is the output gap derived from the HP filter. Table 3 presents estimates of the coefficients using U.S. data for the period 1983.1-2005.4. Estimation of (4.1) over this period is relatively insensitive to the inclusion of a measure of food and energy shocks, hence these are omitted for the sake of parsimony and compatibility with the model. 7 The frequency with which firms obtain new aggregate information could theoretically be a function of the level and variance of inflation. Focusing on this period is thus more likely to satisfy the implicit estimation assumption that λ is constant.
While the Phillips curve coefficients comprise the macro moments of interest, I also include two moments from empirical studies on micro pricing: the mean duration between price changes and the mean (absolute) size of price changes. These moments will be useful in determining the size of the menu cost Φ and the size of the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic marginal cost shocks σ χ affecting the firms. Using price data underlying computation of the consumer price index by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the U.S., Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007) estimate a mean duration between regular price changes of 8.6 months, or 2.87 quarters, and a mean size of regular price changes of 11.3% (in absolute terms). Call these moments ξ 3 and ξ 4 , respectively.
Indirect inference uses model simulations to estimate the structural model parameters that minimize the weighted difference between moments estimated on simulated data and those estimated using U.S. data (e.g., Gouriéroux et al. 1993) . Let [ , , , ] ' 
The positive definite weighting matrix Ω is the identity matrix. Estimation of ψ was conducted via simulated annealing (e.g., Goffe et al. 1994 ) with multiple starting points chosen to ensure that 8 ψ is the global minimum.
A considerable amount of informational and real rigidity is necessary for the model to match both the macro and the micro data. Table 3 presents results from the estimation. The estimate of λ is 0.297 (with standard error 0.077), implying a highly significant role for sticky information in matching the data. By itself, this value implies that a firm has a 30% probability of acquiring new information in a given quarter and that firms would update their information on average once every 3.4 quarters. This is the interpretation in the standard sticky-information model. However, this paper's model with sticky prices imposes a maximal length of time beyond which a firm acquires new information with certainty (j max =8 quarters). Because this upper bound causes some firms to "automatically" acquire new information, 31% of firms actually acquire new information in an average quarter, and the average length of time between information updates is 3.2 quarters.
The estimate of γ is 0.06 (with standard error 0.026). As Woodford (2003, p. 173) writes that an estimate of real rigidity (or strategic complementarity) "in the range between 0.10 and 0.15 does not require implausible assumptions," this estimate suggests that the presence of sticky information is not a substitute for relatively strong strategic complementarities across firms.
Finally, the sizes of the menu cost and idiosyncratic shock are highly significant, indicating that both are necessary in a representative-firm model to match the micro data. Menu 8 Note that the model utilizes the "true" output gap-i.e., the difference between actual output and the fullinformation, frictionless rate of output-while the latter is approximated in the U.S. data by the HP filter. To make the model's "true" output gap better conform to the estimated output gap in indirect inference, low-frequency variations in the model's "true" output gap were removed using the HP filter and a weighting parameter of 160,000. (Table 2) , though it is biased down by the fact that nearly onethird of information updates occur because firms go j max periods since their previous update. In addition, the estimate of γ is less than 0.01 (and statistically insignificantly different from zero).
11 Naturally, the model's ability to match the empirical evidence on micro price adjustment deteriorates, as firms change prices in virtually every period by small amounts. 12 But more important is that the model with only sticky information is unable to match the macro data as well as the model with sticky information and sticky prices. This is evident from Table 3 . The sticky-price/sticky-information model better matches the macro data for four of the five Phillips curve coefficients. Overall, the sum of squared differences between the empirically estimated coefficients and those from the simulated models is smaller for the sticky-price/stickyinformation model than for the model with only sticky information. Thus the evidence suggests that the sticky-price/sticky-information model not only better matches the micro data than a model with only sticky information, but it also better matches the macro data than a model with only sticky information.
Implications and Discussion
The model affords the opportunity to track both aggregate variables and the underlying decisions of individual firms as well. This is done in depth in Figure 3 through Figure 5 and in Table 4 . which occurs in period 0 begins a long expansion in which inflation rises gradually, peaking seven quarters after the shock occurs. These results are not influenced by the fact that the upper bound on information acquisitions is set to j max =8; increasing the bound by one does not affect 12 Very few firms are constrained by the discretization (grid) technique used to solve the problem: more than 99.5% of prices change in any given quarter. Recall that the sticky-information model abstracts from idiosyncratic shocks to better correspond to the versions presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002 , 2006 and Reis (2006b) , which produces many small price changes.
the figure. Thus the combination of sticky prices, sticky information, and real rigidity is capable of generating substantial monetary non-neutrality. Table 4 presents additional statistics on the microeconomic aspects of the model. While the mean duration between price changes is 2.837 quarters, the median duration is slightly lower at 2 quarters. The mean size of a price change is around 12%. In the U.S. data, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007) report a mean duration (across categories) between regular price changes of 8.6 months (2.867 quarters), a median duration of 7.2 months (2.4 quarters), and an average size of 11%.
However, there are discrepancies between the model and the empirical data. Table 4 shows that "small" price changes-those less than 5% in absolute value-comprise less than 1% of all price changes in the model. By contrast, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007) find that 44% of regular price changes fall into this category. Additional heterogeneity-perhaps in the form of heterogeneous menu costs-could help the model along this dimension.
The heterogeneity induced by idiosyncratic shocks to marginal costs plays an important role in the model. First and foremost, these shocks are a necessary feature to match the stylized fact that price changes are large-much larger than could be explained, given their average frequency, by macroeconomic variables alone. This point has been raised by Golosov and Lucas (2007) , among others. But also important is that, as Caballero and Engel (1993) show, idiosyncratic shocks in a state-dependent pricing model desynchronize pricing decisions at the firm level, reducing the potential for multiple equilibria. By itself, sticky information would induce heterogeneity and reduce firms' abilities to perfectly synchronize; however, it would not necessarily affect their desires to synchronize as do large idiosyncratic shocks.
An interesting feature of the model is the interaction between state-dependent pricing and the acquisition of aggregate information, a feature that is not available when firms make timedependent pricing decisions. Figure 4 plots how the frequency of price change varies depending on the amount of time since the firm's last aggregate information update. Two patterns are notable. First, firms with information that is three to six quarters old are relatively more likely to change their prices than average, in particular because more firms make price increases than normal. This phenomenon is caused by positive trend inflation in the model: firms with slightly older macroeconomic information will assume that their prices have fallen in real terms, ceteris paribus, and this condenses the range of inaction in their (S,s) problems given their information sets. Thus a given idiosyncratic shock is more likely to push them into action when they have older macroeconomic information. The second pattern of note is that, if firms know they will acquire information in the next period, they are relatively less likely to change their prices in the current period. In the figure, this occurs when it has been eight quarters since their last information update, since this coincides with j max . In particular, firms are especially wary of cutting prices immediately prior to a known update, for fear that inflation may have been higher than anticipated, thus requiring them to undo the price decrease more quickly than what would be optimal.
In closely related work, Klenow and Willis (2007) A criticism that can be leveled against the model and the Mankiw-Reis stickyinformation assumption is that-if taken literally-the cost of observing the aggregate variables necessary to make an optimal pricing decision (in this case, P t and M t /P t ) should be minimal.
Thus one may wonder why a profit-maximizing firm would wait three quarters on average to obtain these pieces of information. Of course, the information problems of real-world firms are exceedingly more complex than the model presented here: there are many more variables and shocks, and there is much more unquantifiable uncertainty. The industrial manufacturer studied by Zbaracki et al. (2004) spent approximately $100,000 on information-acquisition costs alone.
Figuring out how to use this information constitutes another important barrier to inaction-that is, the costs of processing information could be such that firms only choose to acquire and process information infrequently.
As a last point, there are several ways that one can assess the formation of expectations via the forecasting rule (2.8). As noted in the impulse responses of Section III, the linear modelconsistent expectations combined with an upper bound on the number of quarters a firm will go between information updates yield comparable dynamics to variants of the Mankiw-Reis model with fully rational expectations. In addition, Table 4 presents the R 2 s for the one-period-ahead version of the forecasting rule (whose coefficients are used iteratively to form j-period-ahead forecasts), which Krusell and Smith (1998) suggest is one way to assess the goodness-of-fit of the forecasting rule. At 0.999, the fit is quite good across the simulations. Figure 5 plots the actual realizations of M t /P t and the one-period-ahead forecasted series (M t /P t ) F for a representative simulation with the estimated parameters for the sticky-price/sticky-information model, offering graphical evidence that the forecasted series appears to be quite close to the realized values.
V Conclusion
This paper proposes a model that combines two forms of stickiness: sticky prices and sticky information. Estimation of the model based on U.S. data suggests that both forms of stickiness are necessary to match empirical evidence. Using indirect inference, I estimate that 31% of firms update their information in an average quarter, and the average duration between updates is 3.2 quarters. The data also require strong real rigidities, with a reduced-form parameter estimate of 0.06. Finally, the representative firm faces menu costs equal to 1.45% of steady state revenues and large idiosyncratic shocks, with a standard deviation of 7%.
This paper also finds that sticky prices are not only important in improving the model's ability to match the empirical evidence on micro price adjustment. In addition, they also improve the model's ability to match the macro data. This strengthens the argument for ensuring that macroeconomic models have the "right" microeconomic foundations.
One area where the model fails to match the empirical evidence on price adjustment at the micro level is in terms of the distribution of the size of price changes. In particular, the model fails to produce the many "small" price changes that are witnessed in the data. The introduction of heterogeneity among firms, perhaps in terms of their menu costs, could help to remedy this deficiency.
Given the complexity of combining sticky information with state-dependent sticky prices, the model and estimation strategy were kept simple to maintain tractability. This has led to the omission of a number of interesting issues, such as a more thorough treatment of the aggregatedemand side of the economy and systematic monetary policy. Further consideration of these issues is left for ongoing research.
VI Appendix: Construction of Impulse Response Figures
Since the Markov process used to approximate (2.4) does not easily lend itself to a simple impulse response, generalized impulse responses were created by simulating the model S=10,000
times. In each simulation, the exogenous money growth process took on its trend valuenormalized to zero for the sake of the figures-in quarter t=−1. The shock in each simulation occurred in quarter t=0 and was 1.3% (annualized). Thereafter, money growth was determined randomly by the Markov process. For large S, the mean response approximates the actual response of (2.4) to a single shock. Likewise, it is assumed that the mean responses over the S simulations of inflation and the output gap approximate their actual responses as well.
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